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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF LAW
SHOULD BE REVIEWED UNDER A
CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD
The Board incorrectly states the appropriate standard of review. Petitioner is
seeking relief under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(b) and (d), which allows
judicial review of an agency action beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute,

or an agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law. The appropriate
standard of review for cases falling under subsection (4)(b) was addressed by the
Utah Supreme Court in Bennion v. ANR Production Co.. 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991).
Bennion held that challenges under subsection (4)(b) present questions of general law
appropriate for correction of error standard, with no deference to agency
interpretation. Id at 349.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of review for
cases falling under subsection (4)(d) in Savage Industries v. State Tax Com'n.. 811
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Regarding subsection (4)(d) Savage held:
This incorporates the correction of error standard previously applied by
the Utah courts in cases involving agency interpretations of law. This
incorporation of the correction of error standard is confirmed by looking
at the legislative history of the UAPA . . .This approach is mandated
whether arrived at under the terms of the UAPA or under the holdings
of our prior case law.
Id at 669-670.
The Board misapplies Utah case law in support of its argument that the
reviewing court should grant deference to the Board's interpretation of law. These
misapplications, found on pages one and two of its brief, resultfromquotations taken
out of context. The Board confuses the standard of review issue when it states on
page one of its brief:

2

Because the claimant does not dispute the underlying material facts, the
Board's decision '"calls for application of statutes and administrative
rules to a specific factual situation.'" SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. V.
Workforce Appeals Bd., 1999 UT App 210, ^8, 983 P.2d 581 (quoting
Professional Staff Mgmt., Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 953
P.2d 76,79 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
This is a misrepresentation of SOS. In SOS the issue presented to the court
concerned the Board's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405( 1 )(a) providing
that, "A claimant is ineligible for benefits if 'the claimant left work voluntarily
without good cause.'" Because the claimants did not dispute having left the employ
of SOS Staffing Services voluntarily, the court determined the degree of deference
would be less than if those facts had been in dispute. The court found in SOS that:
Here, because "proper application of the Employment Security Act and
the relevant rules 'requires little highly specialized or technical
knowledge that would be uniquely within the [Board's ] expertise'
. . . this court will review the agency's decision 'with only moderate
deference.'"[citations omitted].
The Board misinterprets SOS in its relevancy to the present case. The lack of
dispute of the underlying facts, in the present case, cannot lead to the conclusion that
the present case is "like" SOS, in that, here, petitioner is concerned only with the
issue of jurisdiction, and interpretations of law related to that issue.
Likewise, the Board's reliance upon King v. Industrial Comm'n.. 850 P.2d
1281 (Utah Ct. App 1993) is misplaced. In King, the court reviewed prior case law

3

concerning the question of finding "explicit" or "implied" grants of discretion to the
agency. In that case the court concluded that under a specific portion of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988), there was no express
or implied grant of discretion given to the agency. The court held in that case:
[Bjecause the language is not broad and expansive but is narrow and
mandatory and is subject to construction by traditional rules of statutory
construction, the statute does not contain an implicit grant of discretion.
We, therefore, review the Industrial Commission's action . . . for
correctness.
Professional Staff Mgmt.. Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec. 953 P.2d 76, 79
(Utah Cr. App. 1998) is similarly taken out of context, and is irrelevant in the present
case.
The Board next cites Morton Intern.. Inc. V. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 5 81 (Utah
1991) in support of its argument that a "degree of deference" should be given to the
Board if its decision is within "the bounds of reasonableness."

The Board

misrepresents Morton by taking statements out of context, and instead presents
another case which does not support the Board's view. Morton addressed the issue
whether standards of review developed in prior case law had been altered after the
adoption of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act. The Court found that Utah
courts had developed "three levels of review in connection with agency action":
First, agencies' findings of fact were granted considerable deference and
4

would not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence
(footnote omitted). Second, a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to agencies decisions, was used to review agencies' rulings on
issues the court characterized as concerning general law (footnote
omitted). Examples of issues characterized as questions of general law
include . . . rulings concerning the agency's jurisdiction or statutory
authority... and rulings concerning interpretation of statutes unrelated
to the agency (footnote omitted).
Id at 585. The court also held in Morton:
[I]n granting judicial relief when an 'agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law,' the language of section 63-46b-16(4) clearly
indicates that absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard
is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a
statutory term (footnote omitted).
Id. at 588. Citing Morton, the court comments in Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce.
828 P.2d 507, 514 n.12 (Utah App. 1992):
We note for purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review
that a grant of discretion to an agency to make factual findings . . .
should not be confused with a grant of discretion to interpret a given
statutory term. Since the authority to make factual findings is often
granted to agencies, such a misinterpretation would require deference to
agencies in virtually every case-thereby causing the exception to
consume the rule set forth in Morton. In the present case, the petitioner
seeks relief from the court only in regards to the Department's
interpretation of law as it relates to its assumption ofjurisdiction for the
purpose of imposing civil penalties. Because the present case is
restricted to this single issue, Utah case law supports that a correction
of error standard of review is appropriate.

5

POINT TWO
THE RULE OF "PLAIN LANGUAGE" DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
The Board argues that the "plain meaning" of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406
supports an interpretation of law which grants to itself continuous jurisdiction for the
purpose of imposing the civil penalty described in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4405(5)(c). The Board's argument is a specious application of the fundamental rule of
statutory construction as articulated in Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Assay. 932 P.2d 592,
594 (Utah 1997):
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are
generally to be construed according to their plain language.
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to
contradict its plain meaning. Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, 890
P.2d 1020 (1995) (and cases cited therein).
The above rule, that language may not be interpreted contrary to its "plain
meaning," is related to another established rule of statutory construction, that "a word
is known by the company it keeps." This latter principle has been restated through
other maxims, one of which is "expressio unious est exclusio" ("expression of one
thing is the exclusion of the other").1 Under this doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court
•Hansen v. Wilkinson. 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983).
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cites remarks in Sutherland Statutory Construction that "it probably is not wholly
inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean
something else."2 Applying this principle, it must be noted that the actual words
found in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 do not include the language, or refer to the
language providing the specific "civil penalty" described in Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4405(5)(c). Under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the "meaning"
of "civil penalty," as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c)3 cannot be
included as an integral part Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406, because the word "civil
penalty" is not said. To do so would impute to the legislature that when they say (and
define) one thing, i.e. "benefits,"4 or "repayment of benefits," they really mean
something else entirely.
The Board cites, on page ten of its brief, Decker v. Industrial Commission. 533
P.2d 898,899 (Utah 1975). This case is irrelevant here. The petitioner has not asked
the Board to "reduce or forgive any part of the penalty." The petitioner argues only
2

IcL, citing 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4th ed.

1973).
3

"an amount equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of
his fraud"
4

Defined under § 35A-4-201(3) "Benefits" means the money payments
payable to an individual as provided in this chapter with respect to the individual's
unemployment.
7

that the Board lacks jurisdiction to impose the civil penalty provided under Utah
Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405(5)(c), and that the Board misinterprets the Utah Employment
Security Act when it attempts to bring the civil penalty imposed under Utah Code
Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) under the provisions for continuing jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a).
POINT THREE
ADDING OR DELETING WORDS
TO THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY UTAH CASE LAW OR
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The Board argues on page ten of its brief that "The plain language of a statute
is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other
provisions in the same statute and 'with other statutes under the same and related
chapters'" (citations omitted). The Board confuses this "plain language" argument
by next requesting, on page eleven of its brief, that the court engage in a type of
statutory interpretation that requires remedies provided only under traditional rules
of statutory construction, i.e., the insertion or incorporation of words or concepts not
explicitly stated in the statute. Utah courts apply these rules of statutory construction
only when statutes are found ambiguous: "When language is clear and unambiguous,
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction."
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Luckau v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission Of Utah. 840 P.2d 811,815
(Utah App. 1992). The rule is stated in Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce. 828 P.2d
507, 510 (Utah App. 1992):
If a statute is ambiguous, however, we apply traditional rules of
statutory construction under the assumption that the Legislature was
operating under such rules. We also assume that the Legislature
expected the agency to likewise apply the traditional rules of statutory
interpretation. No deference is therefore given to the agency's
interpretation if an otherwise ambiguous statute may be interpreted in
accordance with traditional rules of interpretation. See Morton at 589.
Rather than a "plain language" argument, the Board's argument suggests an
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 which would, in effect, insert the
words "civil penalty" under subsection 2(a) alongside the word "benefits," and under
subsection 4(a) alongside the provision requiring repayment of benefits. (Adding the
words under only (2)(a) or only (4)(a) would leave the section ambiguous). Adding
the words "civil penalty" into Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2) and (4)(a) would,
indeed, correct any assumed oversight or inadvertent omission by the legislature,
however, Utah courts have denied the power to do so. In Luckau v. Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission Of Utah. 840 P.2d 811,815 (Utah App. 1992) the court
held:
In interpreting a statute, courts should avoid adding to or
deleting from statutory language, unless absolutely
necessary to "make it a rational statute." 2A Norman J.
9

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.38 (5th ed.
1992); see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d
65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991).
. . . .We presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and gave effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning. We must be guided by the
law as it is . . . . When language is clear and unambiguous,
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is
left for construction. Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d
872, 875 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).
POINT FOUR
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISH
INDEPENDENT SECTIONS FROM DEPENDENT SUBSECTIONS

The Board next argues that the terms 'benefits' or 'repay the sum' under Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a) should be interpreted as effectively
incorporating the meaning of "civil penalty" as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A4-405, because "it is clear from the way the relevant, correlated statutes are worded,
that benefit overpayments and their accompanying civil penalties are interrelated and
are to be addressed together." (See page eleven of brief). The Board provides no
examples of "relevant, correlated statutes," citing only a different section of the
Employment Security Act. The section cited, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-305, provides
for the collection of monies owed to the unemployment insurance fund through civil
collection actions, after the employer or claimant defaults on monies owed. The court
10

in Zoll addressed the appropriate rule of statutory construction to be applied when
determining the relationship between sections and subsections within a statute:
. . . The distinction between a subsection and an independent section of
a statute is that the subsection, by its nature, is placed within a context
and thereby limited to the degree that the independent section is not. 2A
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.01 (5th ed.
1992) (footnote omitted).

Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Assay. 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). In United States v.
Butchelder. 581 F2d626(CA7 1978) the court held, "Ifthe meaning of any particular
phrase or section standing alone is clear, no other section or part of the act may be
applied to create doubt." In the present case, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-305 should
not be interpreted as providing a template for statutory construction of every other
section of the Employment Security Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 35A-4-406,35A-4-405
and 35A-4-305 are separate sections within the statute, are clear standing alone, and
create no disharmony amongst their own or other provisions in the same statute. On
the other hand, Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2) and (4) should be interpreted
through, and limited by, the context of the section they occur within. Thus,
"continuing jurisdiction" in subsection (2) is granted over "benefits" and the
"repayment of benefits" as provided in subsection (4).

11

POINT FIVE
"BENEFITS" ARE DEFINED BY THE
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
The term 'benefits,' as used within the sentence "Jurisdiction over benefits
shall be continuous," under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(2)(a) and (4)(a) is defined
under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-201(3):
"Benefits" means the money payments payable to an individual as
provided in this chapter with respect to the individual's unemployment.
Sutherland Statutory Construction5 states:
As a rule a definition which declares what a term means is binding upon
the courts. Limitations have been noted. For example, if the definition
is arbitrary, creates obvious incongruities in the statute, defeats a major
purpose of the legislation or is so discordant to common usage as to
generate confusion, it should not be used . . . A definition which
declares what a term means, on the other hand, excludes any meaning
that is not stated.
In the present case, the meaning of the term 'benefits' has been declared by the
Employment Security Act. The definition is not arbitrary nor discordant to common
usage, does not create incongruities in the statute, and does not defeat a major
purpose of the legislation.6 "Benefits," or their "repayment," should, therefore, not
5

2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.07 (6th ed.

2000).
6

Leaving "benefits" defined as provided in the statute necessarily entails
disgorgement of any benefits procured by the claimant's wrongdoing, thereby
12

be redefined to conceptually incorporate the meaning of the term 'civil penalties' as
the term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c). Incorporating the civil
penalty provided under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) into the meaning of
"benefits" or their repayment, would, itself, create an arbitrary and incongruous
result. The term 'benefits,' and their repayment, as it presently occurs withing Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-406 is logical within the context of that section:
35A-4-406(2)(a) Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous
35A-4-406(4)(a) Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received
any sum as benefits (i.e., "money payments payable to an individual
with respect to the individual's unemployment") under this chapter
to which he was not entitled shall repay the sum to the division for the
fund.
The insertion of the term 'civil penalties,' as that term is used under Utah Code Ann.
§35A-4-405(5)(c) would rewrite the section to read:
35A-4-406(4)(a) Any person who by reason of his fraud, has received
any sum as benefits under this chapter to which he was not entitled shall
repay the sum ("money payments payable to an individual with
respect to the individual's unemployment and, an amount equal to
the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud") to
the division for the fund.
The present wording under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(4)(a), requiring any person
to "repay the sum" he has "received" (as benefits) is, thereby, redefined to require
encouraging honesty in reporting and a replenishment of the fund.
13

"repayment" of an amount of money which was at no time "received" by the person
(the civil penalty doubles the sum actually received). Because the term 'repay'
cannot be credibly redefined to include an amount never paid, "repay" would need
to be deleted in subsection (4)(a). After ridding subsection (4)(a) of the word "repay,"
it must next be assumed that "benefits" under subsection (2)(a) can be sufficiently
broadened in its definition under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-201 (3), to include the civil
penalty provision under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c), thereby, allowing the
"continuing jurisdiction" sought by the Board.

The necessary redefining of

subsections (4)(a) and (2)(a) to accomplish the Board's goals, generates incongruities
and, therefore, confusion in the provisions under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406.
POINT SIX
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
DO NOT SUPPORT AN "ASSOCIATION OF WORDS"
The Board's argues on page eleven of its brief, that provisions under Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-305 make it clear that "benefit overpayments" and "civil
penalties" are "linked," "interrelated," and "are to be addressed together." Whether
or not "civil penalties" and "benefit overpayments" are "linked," or in what way the
terms are "interrelated" and should be "addressed together," requires an analysis
through, and an application of, the rule of statutory construction for the "associations
14

of words." Involved specifically, are certain other doctrines included within the
statutory construction principle that "a word is known by the company it keeps." This
rule of statutory construction is elaborated upon in Hansen v. Wilkinson. 658 p.2d
1216,1217 (Utah 1983):
The concisely expressed principle that "a word is known by the
company it keeps" has been restated throughout the jurisdictions of this
country [footnote omitted] under the maxims of (1) "noscitur a sociis"7
(2) "ejusdem generis", 8 ... The first of these doctrines postulates that
"the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words associated with it," the second that "general and
specific words which are capable of an analogous meaning, being
associated together, take colorfromeach other so that the general words
are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general." [Citations
omitted.] In 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, §47.16,
et seq., (4th ed. 1973) the first of these doctrines is explained as follows:
"When two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a
similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word
will be limited and qualified by the special word." The second of the
above doctrines is commonly applied, so that "where general words are
subjoined to specific words, the general words will not include any
objects of a class superior to that designated by the specific words."..
[Citations omitted.]
One implication, in an analysis of the Board's argument, is that the meaning
of 'benefit overpayments,' as the broader term, should be interpreted in a way which
includes 'civil penalty,' as the specific term. Drawing such an association between
7

"It is known from its associates."

8

"Of the same class."

15

the words "benefit overpayments" and "civil penalty" under the maxim ofnoscitur
a sociis, requires that "benefit overpayments" be grouped within a category of things
with similar meanings which also includes the words "civil penalty," and that the
former term is limited and qualified by, the later term. If the words "benefit
overpayments" and "civil penalties" are thus considered, established rules of statutory
construction require an examination whether the definition of "civil penalty" is
understood as applying to things of the same kind as "benefit overpayments," and
also whether "benefit overpayments" include any object of a class superior to "civil
penalty."
While the "repayment of benefits," may be thought of as a type of "penalty" in
its broad sense, a "civil penalty" is not a type of "benefit overpayment." A "civil
penalty" is "a sum of money which the law exacts payment of by way of punishment
for doing some act which is prohibited or for not doing some act which is required to
be done."9 A "benefit overpayment" is the receiving of payment of money to any
person to which, under a redetermination or decision, he has been found not entitled.10
Within the meaning of the Employment Security Act, a "benefit overpayment" may
occur through agency error, an individual's error, an individual's "fault," or an
9

Black's Law Dictionary 1020 (Fifth ed. 1979).

10

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-4-406(4).
16

individual's "fraud." Therefore, the term 'benefit overpayment,' within the context
of the Employment Security Act, belongs to a class comprised of different kinds of
things than a "civil penalty," and the term 'benefits overpayment' cannot, therefore,
be limited by the term 'civil penalty.' The two terms cannot be "grouped" together,
because they do not have a similar meaning. Thus, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis
does not apply
Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the words "benefit overpayments" and
"civil penalty" must, being associated together, take color from each other so that
"benefit overpayments" is restricted to a sense analogous to "civil penalty," and does
not include any objects of a class superior to that designated by "civil penalty." As
argued above, "benefit overpayments" is not capable of an analogous meaning with
"civil penalty." Additionally, the class of objects belonging to the category of "benefit
overpayments" are also of a much broader designation, than the term 'civil penalty'
can encompass.
Sutherland Statutory Construction states that, "Where a general term appears
with no enumeration, with other general terms, or with specific terms not suggesting
a class, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply."77 In the present case, the maxim
"2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47:20 (6th ed.
2000).
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cannot, therefore, apply, because the general term 'benefit overpayments' appears
with no enumeration. The context within which the term 'civil penalty' occurs,
suggests more of "general term" or a "specific term not suggesting a class."12
POINT SEVEN
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE
THE BOARD'S PRESENT INTERPRETATION
The Board argues on page twelve of its brief, that granting it continuous
jurisdiction for the purpose of imposing the civil penalty provided for under Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(5)(c) is required to protect the fiscal soundness of the
unemployment insurance fund. The court in Morton states that:
Questions of legislative intent are considered questions of law, which
are reviewed for correctness under our prior case law (footnote omitted)
and section 63-46b-16(4)(d). Therefore, when a legislative intent
concerning the specific question at issue can be derived through
traditional methods of statutory construction, the agency's interpretation
will be granted no deference and the statute will be interpreted in accord
with its legislative intent.

12

A more logical example of word association under these doctrines would
be the association of "farm products" and "eggs." A more complete list of "farm
products"-"eggs," "apples," "wheat" . . . would limit "farm products" to things of
that nature. A "dog" bred to guard the farm, and exacting more from thieves than
the "return of the products" (perhaps analogous to a civil penalty which exacts
more than a "repayment of benefits") would not properly be included within the
category of "farm products."
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Morton Intern.. Inc. V. Auditing Div. 814 P.2d 581, 588, 599 (Utah 1991): the court
cites Savage Industries v. State Tax Com,n..811 P. 2d 664, 666, 670 (Utah 1991);
Hurlev v. Board of Review. 767 P.2d 524,527 (Utah 1988).
As argued above, Utah Code Ann.§ 35A-4-406 already serves to protect the
fund through the necessary disgorgement of any benefits procured by the claimant's
wrongdoing. (See footnote 6). This continuing legal obligation under Utah Code
Ann.§ 35A-4-406(4)(a) for any person who has received any sum by reason of his
fraud, to repay that sum, serves as a "penalty," thereby furthering the legislative
purpose of encouraging honesty in reporting.
It should not be forgotten that the legislature has expressed a desire to place a
limitation of one year upon the state's power to impose civil penalties through Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-29(3). These restrictive legislative provisions further another
important legislative purpose: the statute of limitations prevents the state from
pursuing individuals for civil penalties long after the date of the alleged wrongdoing,
when these allegations have become all but impossible to defend against.

CONCLUSION
This court should find that neither "plain language" arguments, nor established
rules of statutory construction, as applied throughout Utah case law, support the
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Board's interpretation or application of the Employment Security Act. There is no
permissible interpretation of Utah Code Ann.§ 35A-4-406(2)(a) or (4)(a) through
which the Department of Workforce Services is provided with continuing jurisdiction
for the purpose of imposing a civil penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 35 A-4-405(5)(c).
Because the Utah Employment Securities Act does not provide a special case where
a "different limitation is prescribed by statute," as required under the statute of
limitations, and because the Department failed to bring its action within the
prescribed one-year period provided for, it lacked jurisdiction to impose the civil
penalty.
The Workforce Appeals Board should be reversed on the issue of its
assumption of jurisdiction for the purposes of imposing the civil penalty.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

{

day of August, 2002.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellants
BY: L. Kathleen Ferro
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